The Court held that the power of search and seizure could not be subjected to the right to privacy as there was no provision in the Constitution of India analogous to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court therefore upheld the government’s power of search and seizure.

A nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed the right to privacy as a fundamental right under the Constitution of India. It overruled previous judgments of the Supreme Court in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh insofar as they held that the right to privacy was not recognised under the Indian Constitution. The decision did not recognise privacy as a narrow right against physical invasion, or a derivative right under Article 21, but one that covered the body and mind, including decisions, choices, information and freedom. The Court held that the right to privacy may be restricted only if such invasion meets the three-fold requirements of legality (which postulates the existence of a valid law), legitimacy (defined in terms of a legitimate state aim) and proportionality (which demands a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them). Specifically, the judgment held informational privacy to be a part of the right to privacy.

Dealing with physical surveillance, this was the first time that a judicial opinion from the Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right (Subba Rao, J.’s dissent).

In this case, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court for the first time affirmatively discussed the right to privacy under Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution. The Court made a strong case for the existence of the right, observing that privacy was an essential facet of enjoyment of other constitutional freedoms and liberties.

The Supreme Court held that the right to privacy implies a “right to be let alone”, which further implies that no one could publish anything referring to an individual’s private affairs without the consent of the concerned person unless it was based upon public records.

A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court in this decision observed that “the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy of one's home or office without interference can certainly be claimed as ‘right to privacy’” and held that telephone-tapping would violate Article 21 unless it was permitted under a procedure established by law. Phone-tapping without appropriate safeguards, and without following legal process, was a violation of individuals’ fundamental right to privacy. The Supreme Court upheld the right to privacy and noted that it could not be violated except by a procedure established by law. 

The Court held that in case of conflict between the right to privacy and right to health of another, the latter would prevail as right to privacy envisaged under Article 21 was not absolute and that the right to “be let alone” could be restricted on grounds of public interest and the right of another to “be informed”.

The Supreme Court discussed parameters for reasonable search and seizure procedures. It observed that persons in India like the U.S have a right to privacy “both of the house and of the person”. It reiterated the accepted position of Indian and American jurisprudence that the right to privacy dealt with persons and not places and stated that “the documents or copies of documents of the customer which are in Bank, must continue to remain confidential vis-à-vis the person”.

The Court held that forcible termination of pregnancy would violate the woman’s right to liberty and reproductive choice, which in turn would infringe on her rights to “privacy, dignity and bodily integrity” under Article 21.

The Court analysed the right to privacy in the context of narco-analysis and the right against compelled testimony, and observed that the concept of autonomy, decisional privacy and the choice to remain silent are inherent to both, and thus protected as fundamental rights under the Constitution. It specifically emphasized on the overlap between Art. 21 and Art. 20(3). It acknowledged that while the investigation process and collection of evidence inherently violates physical privacy of the subject, this could not extend to compelling a person to disclose privately held information under the influence of certain drugs that would render them incapable of exercising control over the information they provide.

The transgender community’s rights to privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal integrity were reaffirmed and the legal recognition of gender identity was considered part of the right to dignity and freedom guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Court analysed the constitutionality of S. 377 of the Indian Penal Code against the bedrock of Arts. 14, 15, 19 and 21 of the Constitution, and struck down the provision in so far as it criminalized sexual conduct between consenting adults. It relied on the NALSA judgment (above) in observing that sexual orientation and gender identity is an integral part of an individual’s personhood, as well as Puttaswamy’s recognition of the intrinsic interrelationship between privacy, autonomy and sexual identity. It further observed that the restriction in S.377 was disproportionate and unreasonable as it restricted the LGBTQ Community’s right to self-expression and private choice and did not further any legitimate goal (in spite of the State’s arguments in favour of holding decency and morality to be in larger public interest). The Court averred that fundamental rights cannot be curtailed on the basis of subjective notions of morality, and they must all heed to ‘constitutional morality’. Thus, S. 377 could not avail the protection of the three-pronged test that justified lawful state intrusion with privacy.

The Supreme Court held that decisions concerning one’s death fall within the sphere of private choice and autonomy, and that the right to privacy encompasses the right to dignity in death.

The Court upheld the validity of the Aadhaar Act while observing that it did not create a surveillance state or violate the right to privacy.

The Supreme Court upheld the right to data privacy of the electorate in Madhya Pradesh and prohibited the publication of a scannable voter list in text format as prayed for by the Petitioner.

The Supreme Court significantly held that compelling an accused to give his voice sample during the course of investigation did not violate the right to privacy, as such an order fell within the reasonable limits of a ‘compelling public interest’.

The Supreme Court held that installing CCTV cameras in dance bars in the state violated the privacy of all involved stakeholders. The Respondent had argued that there was public interest in such surveillance, as it aimed at preventing prostitution rackets under the guise of dance bars, as well as for the general purpose of maintain public decency. However, the Court held privacy to surpass that of any apparent public interest with respect to the installation of CCTV cameras, especially in light of other licensing requirements that can fulfil the public interest objective.

The Court held that in cases where public interests in accessing certain information outweighs the possible violation of privacy, dissemination of such information is permitted notwithstanding the exception under S. 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.

The case deals with the right to keep the name of a victim of sexual assault private and the conduct of the media It deals with the right to keep the name of a victim of sexual assault private and the conduct of the media to publicize the same. J. Sanghi of the Delhi HC held that certain media houses, which publicized the name of the victim in a particular case would be liable for having intruded the privacy of the victim. 

The Plaintiff (LNG Petronet), a company setting up LNG terminals in the country approached the Court asking it to restrain the Defendant from publishing information relating to the plaintiff’s commercial developments on the defendants website at www.indianpetro.com. The Plaintiff alleged that these news reports published by the Defendants were interfering in its contract negotiations with third parties as well as limiting the Plaintiffs ability to negotiate as to the rates for LNG supply.

The legal grounds utilized to press for the relief was on the grounds of, (a) breaches to the right of privacy; (b) publication of the information related to confidential negotiations and contractual clauses; (c) the publication violated the SEBI regulation on price sensitive information. The court rejected all the three contentions, playing on “public interest” served in the disclosure of the information as opposed to a “gag order” placed on a journalistic entity, especially when the information related to a company which was partly owned by the government as well as provided public utility services.

The case concerned an effort by Indu Jain (matriarch of the Bennett, Coleman group) to stop Forbes from featuring her family, in the Forbes List of Indian Billionaires. There were detailed arguments on privacy made in the case, though the court eventually came out against Indu Jain and allowed the publication. One of the key points on which the case turned was the initial supply of information and cooperation of the representatives of Indu Jain with Forbes. The court reasoned that a person who voluntarily provides information about themselves would be naturally precluded from claiming privacy or protection on it later. Hence one can see that the privacy argument is a complete non-starter.