This Article analyses the standard laid down by the English Courts in Reynolds, with particular emphasis on how that decision has affected media practices and reporting. This is done through empirical evidence rather than doctrinal analysis. It concludes that, although Reynolds has had some impact on British defamation law as well as on the practices of the British media, the impact has not been as dramatic as the Sullivan decision’s impact on U.S. press and media practices.

This article explores the mechanism by which the task of balancing the societal interest in the free flow of information against the interest in securing responsibility in dissemination of information and in protecting individual reputation from unwarranted injury can be carried out. It argues that the present remedy of libel action is unsuited to promoting free press, and advocates for the introduction of a retraction and a Right to Reply legislation to replace the remedy of libel.

The article argues that the Reynolds case has not ushered in a more protective era for investigative journalism, and that it may even be plausibly claimed that the methodology of Reynolds is responsible for causing a chill to free speech and expression. It thus argues for reform of English Defamation law as it relates to the press.

This article argues that given the growth of the new Internet press, as well as the transformation of the traditional press, the First Amendment doctrines governing the use of anonymous sources need reconsideration. Given this argument, this article offers a new theory of libel law as it pertains to the use of anonymous sources. It also analyses constitutional arguments for special press privileges, particularly with respect to their relevance to the new media.